Introduction
Donors have begun increasingly to encourage their field partners in recent years, to attain financial sustainability in the provision of financial services (FS) and thereby phase out the need for a continual grant (Jackelen and Rhyne 1991; Yaron 1992; Bennett and Cuevas 1996; Dichter 1996) . The attraction of sustainability to a donor is not difficult to understand, particularly as it can easily be measured (Johnson and Rogaly 1997) by the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDO' developed by Yaron (1992) . Higher values of SDI effectively imply 'unsustainability' of the FS while zero or negative values of the SDI suggest that the FS is 'sustainable'.
Nevertheless, FS institutions generally have a bad record of achieving sustainability (Yaron, 1992; Rhyne and Otero 1994) , perhaps in part because non-government organisations (NGOs), a major player in FS provision, may not have adequate personnel or institutional structures to manage PS schemes effectively (Johnson and Rogaly 1997) . As a result, it has been argued that the donors behind NGOs take a more active role in management rather than their more traditional passive role of providing the cash and letting the NGO get on with implementation (Schmidt and Zeitinger 1996) .
While donors can be considered as having a moral right to such an involvement, there is a danger that they may begin to make decisions without the necessary experience and knowledge of the local situation, and with unreasonable time scales (Hulme and Mosley 1996). Some have also questioned the drive towards sustainability on the part of the donors (Dichter 1996; Brown 1997 ). This criticism is based on a number of arguments. To begin with, sustainability may result in an understandable tendency to focus on those best able to repay loans, rather than those in need. Secondly an emphasis on sustainability may drive the field partner to focus on FS provision and nothing else (Mutua 1994; Berenbach and Guzman 1994; Dichter 1996) . Indeed as the number of loans issued, number of savings accounts held, amounts saved, loan repayment rates etc. are all easily quantifiable, they can act as strict 'indicators'
The higher the SDI, the more the interest rate needs to he increased to make the FS institution self-sufficient. Yaron (1992) * assumes an Igala population of 1000,000 of performance for use by donors and others (Tendler 1989). This article discusses some of these aspects of FS sustainability with a case study of the Diocesan Development Services (DDS) -a Catholic Mission based NGO in Kogi State, Nigeria. The DDS FS scheme is not large relative to other well-known PS projects (Table 1) or even formal Nigerian initiatives such as the Peoples Bank (Tiamiyu 1994; Soyibo 1996) . However, the DDS experience provides some useful lessons for a number of reasons. First, DDS has considerable experience of operating an FS scheme since the early 1970s. Second, pressure from donors on DDS to quickly achieve sustainability occurred when the social, economic and political circumstances in Nigeria were undergoing a rapid change with the introduction of structural adjustment policies (SAP). Third, DDS was an integral part of a World Bank project from 1978 to 1983. After the gradual demise of the World Bank project DDS re-started its life as an NGO. The FS scheme also went through this 'transition', with many important outcomes.
There are two specific questions that will be addressed in this article:
(1) Is the goal of PS sustainability realistic for DDS, given its involvement in other activities such as onfarm research, primary health care, nutrition and water supply?
A fuller account of the arguments presented in this article can be found in McNamara and Morse (1998 The article will first briefly highlight the background within which DDS has had to operate since its birth in the early 1970s. This will be followed by a brief history of the DDS FS project with a particular focus on its sustainability and how this has changed. Finally the article will address questions (1) and (2) In common with Nigeria as a whole (Eboh 1995; Soyibo 1996) , there are a number of indigenous self-help organisations in Igalaland operating at village level. The oja is one such organisation and can be described as the traditional weekly meeting of a community group on an entirely voluntary basis. Each member of the oja makes a standard weekly contribution which is equal for all members.
Members in turn receive an amount equal to the sum of all the savings for a week, less the cost of the entertainment and refreshments for the group for that day Various other community responsibilities are discussed at oja meetings, and it therefore plays a central role in regulating village life. While the introduction of a savings scheme helped, it quickly became clear that the sum saved needed to be supplemented with credit and this would require external funding. Obtaining an external input was not a problem, as the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN)3 had a fund available for such initiatives. A decision was made by DDS and senior members to charge interest at the rate of one kobo per month on every naira borrowed (equivalent to an annual interest rate of 12 per cent as one flaira equals 100 kobos), and loans were to be double the amount saved by the FC. Loan contract forms were designed giving legal status to the agreement being entered upon by the FC and DDS, and if the loan was not fully repaid before the next planting season, a further loan would not be forthcoming. These operational matters were clear enough, but the major concern of DDS and the FC membership at the time was with self-reliance. While the emphasis was on savings, the programme needed no external input and therefore was entirely sustainable.
However, a decision to augment savings by a loan, even if on a revolving basis, would require a departure from self-reliance. To help ameliorate this, it was decided after consultation with senior members that farmers in the FC project would be charged a local contribution as well as a small fee to purchase the loan form. Also, as they would be the people responsible for seeing that repayments were made
An institution which provides help and facilities for all the Catholic diocese in Nigeria. within a year the zonal and FC chairmen began to look very seriously at group membership. However, distribution of the money between members was and still is, the PC's responsibility Up to the mid-1970s the DDS savings/credit scheme expanded rapidly. Although it was clear that people were initially drawn to the scheme because of the loan facility rather than savings, all were adamant that the saving component would be maintained as the focal point of social interaction. In parallel with numerical expansion there was an increasing call amongst the membership for other services besides financial. Although the diocese was involved in education and health, integration of development activities was still at an embryonic stage by 1974-75. Gradually the actions of the departments in the diocese gravitated towards each other to provide a more coherent approach to the DDS programme as a whole (see McNamara and
Morse 1996, for examples).
Given the expansion and diversification of activities it was quite clear that the increased requirement could not be met by the CSN, and funding would have to be sought from donors outside the country Various donors were approached and finance was secured, mostly on a rolling 3-year plan basis. Again this challenged the initial notion of self-reliance and was not entered into lightly However, this coincided with a further and far stronger challenge to sustainability which appeared in the mid-1970s - 
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Although the DDS and AADP were so unlike in many respects, there were some interesting parallels. For example, like DDS one of the first services the AADP decided to provide was agricultural credit, and AADP also wished to adapt traditional institutions for this purpose, although this was primarily as a means of minimising transaction costs. Unlike DDS there was no savings element, and in contrast to the DDS, the AADP organised the farmer groups and handed out interest free loans in just a few weeks. Understandably perhaps, given both the wider Nigerian context of the time and the approach of AADP, repayment became extremely problematic and continued to be for the duration of the project. Many of the loans issued were never recovered.
DDS programmes continued to function during the life-time of the AADP, and DDS collaborated with the AADP in many activities particularly in agricultural extension. To all intents and purposes, DDS was absorbed into AADP, although it still retained some independence, and effectively became an organisation within an organisation. The rationale behind the decision to join with AADP may appear paradoxical, but it was felt that, given the obvious size and influence of AADP, it was the only way of ensuring that the DDS philosophy could be maintained. Nevertheless, the AADP did have many negative effects on the FS services offered by DDS, a fact not surprising given that AADP was offering interest-free credit as well as many other low-cost or free services. The concept of self-reliance was outof-date, and the number of FCs dwindled from 800 in 1977, just prior to the AADP, to 250 in 1982.
Although given an extension, the AADP effectively 
Donors And Sustainability
In the early days of the FC project, donors in general were very keen on the DDS approach to development, and one donor in particular was very supportive and provided funds for the FC project and, on a smaller scale, for provision of loans for grinding mills and women's activities. These funds also covered salaries and some administrative costs not covered by the local contribution. Although there was a decline in membership and participation in the FC project during and immediately after the AADP, relationships with donors continued to be one of partnership. Unfortunately and ironically when the oil boom waned and AADP collapsed it became much more difficult to obtain funds from donors, as it took a number of years for them to realise how bad the situation had become.
Nevertheless, DDS continued where it hadfinished prior to the onset of AADP and membership began to expand again. Self-reliance was slowly coming back onto the agenda.
However, just as the transition and upheaval were taking place, DDS was dealt a severe, almost fatal, blow by one of its donors. In the mid to late 1980s this donor changed its approach and began to set
97 out clearly what DDS should be doing and how it had to be done. The FC project and other development activities were to become entirely self-sustaining, and this change was expected to be achieved almost instantaneously (within a year or two).
There was simply no scope for discussion or compromise. What dynamic produced this abrupt change in direction was never entirely clear, although there were significant changes in personnel within the donor organisation at that time and sustainability in FS provision was beginning to achieve some prominence in development circles. For example, a United Nations Symposium held in 1984 which focused on the mobilisation of savings has been seen as a watershed in FS provision as part of development (Seibel 1989) . Whatever the catalyst, the attraction of sustainability from the perspective of a donor is not difficult to appreciate.
Unfortunately the severe pressure to achieve complete sustainability coincided with the worsening conditions resulting from SAP, and the rapid achievement of complete sustainability would have meant a substantial increase in lending rates in parallel with measures to ensure loan recovery Even worse, given the limited resources of DDS this would inevitably have led to a withdrawal from all other areas of development activity, including welfare and on-farm research, so as to concentrate on FS. Although the donor never emphasised that this should be the case, the cost of embarking on the path of complete sustainability would have led to reduced emphasis on other elements of the poverty alleviation strategy DDS was not willing to do this, and fortunately other funders, not so preoccupied with sustainability, were willing to help. Even so,
given the historical importance of the donor to DDS the position was very precarious for a number of years, and DDS came very close to total collapse.
Indeed since that time DDS has been very careful to avoid a single donor becoming so dominant in its affairs, and has successfully undertaken a policy of diversification.
There was much irony in the donor pressure for DDS to achieve complete sustainability in its FS, in that it actually coincided with a more long-term trend towards sustainability in the FC project! It should be remembered that the FS scheme is founded upon an indigenous institution -the ojawith the result that the scheme is largely maintained Values of the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) for DDS along with some wellknown Rural Finance Institutions (based on data provided in Yaron (1992) ).
by the farmers themselves. There are other costs, of course, but by and large DDS is able to keep these to a minimum. There is no need for expensive regional offices or centres, and, as the scheme is based on indigenous knowledge, then finding personnel to help manage it is easy and these do not need to be highly trained or even educated beyond primary level. As a result the sustainability of the FS project has largely been determined by two simple factors: the number of members (more members means more income with little extra cost) and the DDS interest rate for credit (all interest earned on savings is passed on to the farmers except for a small handling charge levied by DDS for each passbook). Except for the basic rule that failure to repay a loan disqualifies a group from collecting a further loan, DDS has never operated any form of screening and in only one or two cases has it had to resort to the courts for loan repayment. Peer pressure has been extremely successful in avoiding such extreme and unpleasant measures.
An illustration of the sustainability of the DDS FS project and how it relates to trends in membership is shown in Given this experience the drive towards providing financial services and nothing else has understandably been viewed with some suspicion by DDS. The Results of a 1996 Survey to determine the Relative Popularity of some of the Services offered by DDS.
The survey was conducted amongst DDS members only (number of respondents = 149). Respondents were asked to rank the popularity of the service from 1 to 9, with 9 being the least popular. The results were analysed using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank test (two-sided). An empty space indicates the absence of any statistical difference at the 5% probability level of the experience with 'compartmentalisation' during the AADP NGOs that dare argue against sustainability in FS have often been accused of wanting to hide their inefficiency (Tendler 1989) . However, given the experience of DDS, the warnings of Dichter (1996) , loo Brown (1997) 
